This paper analyzes the effects of community pressure induced by the public disclosure of toxic emissions information by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program on the relocation of toxic-releasing facilities. We find that, following the first TRI disclosure, toxic facilities are more likely to relocate from communities with high population density, high income, and high educational attainment, and into communities with lower population density, income, and educational attainment. There is also evidence showing that small facilities grow faster after relocating and thus also emit more toxic pollutants. Therefore, the relocation of toxic polluters has contributed to a worsening of environmental injustice following the public release of emissions information.
Introduction
The presence of toxic releasing facilities in populated communities has caused public concerns about the risks they pose to human health, environmental quality, and property values. The potential for being held liable for the damages caused by toxic releases can influence the location decision of firms that are responsible for the pollution. Firms are likely to locate their toxic releasing facilities in communities with lower opposition to toxic emissions. Communities may impose pressure on firms informally through a variety of channels, such as, targeted collective action, threat of liability for health and environmental damages, boycotting the purchase of their products and lobbying politicians for stricter environmental legislation and zoning laws (Pargal & Wheeler, 1996; Hamilton, 1995a) . Research evidence suggests that community pressure is associated with characteristics such as income, population density, and education level (Hartman, Huq, & Wheeler, 1997) . Considerations of this nature can lead to siting decisions that generate disproportionate exposure of socio-economically disadvantaged communities to toxic wastes, leading to the problem of environmental injustice 1 .
Many studies have documented the environmental injustice caused by location disparities of toxic polluters. Early studies showed that communities with low income and a high proportion of minorities tended to face more exposure to toxic wastes 2 . Subsequent research argued that these studies only described the equilibrium outcome of the market and could not tell whether the population characteristics were a consequence or the cause of the location choice of toxic facilities. Specifically, migration by households in response to the location of toxic facilities can alter community demographics. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) showed that the entry of toxic-releasing facilities in a community was associated with a decrease in the local population density over time and with the community becoming poorer and less white.
relocation decisions allows us to compare existing location choice with the new location choice of a facility and thereby control for unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity can be a potential problem when studying de novo entry because an unobserved location characteristic that is attractive to a particular facility may be correlated with a community characteristic 5 . In the case of relocation decisions, the fundamental nature of the facility remains unchanged after the move; thus, a comparison of community characteristics between the old and new locations reveals how the importance of those characteristics has changed, holding other aspects of the facility constant. Relocation choices can have significant effects on environmental injustice if they are frequent and if the toxic emissions of relocating facilities are higher post-relocation.
Our study fills this important gap in the literature by examining the relocation of toxicreleasing facilities following the first provision of the publicly available information about such facilities by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program. With its inception in mid-1989, the TRI disclosed previously "hidden" information on the use and disposal of over 690 toxic chemicals to the public. This sought to correct information asymmetries and to catalyze shareholders, consumers, and environmental interest groups to reveal their preferences for environmental responsibility to the toxic-releasing facilities and increase pressure on the facilities (Hamilton, 2005) . The EPA has considered the information provision to be an effective policy mechanism for inducing self-regulation by facilities: the TRI has garnered significant media coverage, generated negative publicity for large polluters and increased the number of protests and lawsuits from local communities and environmental groups against the facilities 6 , and the national toxic emission level also declined steeply by 40% from 1990 to 2014 (EPA, 2016) 7 .
takes place in a different stage of a facility's life-cycle (Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000; Holl, 2004) . 5 For example, chemical facilities may value locations in the Gulf coast and in the Mississippi valley. These areas are low-lying and may have low income residents because of flooding risk which is not directly related to the location choice of the facilities. 6 See Hamilton (1995a) ; Konar and Cohen (1997) ; Lynn and Kartez (1994) ; MacLean (1996) on stock price change of large polluting firms and the examples of community activities after the TRI. 7 Several other studies show that facilities have responded to the increasing community pressure by reducing their releases (Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998) , participating in voluntary programs such as the 33/50
Nevertheless, researchers also found that the emission reduction after TRI was not evenly distributed across communities, with poor communities enjoying a much smaller reduction of 18% than the national average and African-American communities being consistently more exposed to the toxic pollutants (Ard, 2015; Kalnins & Dowell, 2015) . This phenomenon suggests that the TRI-induced community pressure could vary across communities with different demographics and thus lead to differential behavior of toxic polluters with respect to these communities. Indeed, if the advent of TRI reduced information asymmetries but did so differentially for different socioeconomic groups (e.g., because of differential adoption of information technologies or understanding of the consequences of toxic emissions), or if high socioeconomic groups were better able to mobilize on the basis of the information received or have better access to policy makers, then environmental injustice may actually increase.
We examine the extent to which differential public pressure proxied by community characteristics pushed toxic releasing facilities to relocate away from the communities where public opposition was strongest after 1990. The TRI disclosure after mid-1989 provides a natural experiment to examine the effects of the pre-existing (as of 1990) community characteristics on the subsequent relocation by the facilities. Though residents were often aware prior to that date of the presence of manufacturing facilities in their proximity, they lacked knowledge of harmful emissions emanating from those facilities 8 . The advent of the TRI resulted in dissemination of such knowledge, increasing salience of the presence of such facilities to residents who were in close proximity. The use of the TRI disclosure as a starting point for our analysis mitigates a possible endogeneity problem caused by unobserved confounders, such as the opposition of residents against toxic facilities prior to a facility's initial location decision 9 . Our analysis also controls for various location-specific economic and regulatory program (Khanna & Damon, 1999) , adopt environmental management systems (Anton, Deltas, & Khanna, 2004; Khanna & Anton, 2002) , and adopt pollution prevention practices (Harrington, Deltas, & Khanna, 2014) . 8 To the degree that residents were aware that a proximate facility was generating pollution, they could underestimated its nature and its extent since many toxic pollutants are odorless and colorless (Bui & Mayer, 2003; Currie, Davis, Greenstone, & Walker, 2015) . 9 To the extent that there was public opposition to toxic-releasing facilities when the entry decision was made, this could affect the relocation probabilities of the facilities following entry.
factors and facility-specific characteristics that can affect relocation decisions.
We construct a panel dataset for 23,427 facilities existing before 1990 and which reported to TRI for at least some years during the 1990 to 2011 period. We first estimate the effects of the community characteristics in 1990 on the relocation decision of local toxic facilities over the following ten or twenty years. This yields the treatment effect of community pressure induced by the provision of the TRI on facility relocation; this treatment effect differs across communities with different socioeconomic characteristics. We then investigate the extent to which community characteristics (measured in 1990) affect the annual relocation probability as facility characteristics and other economic and environmental-related variables evolve.
By distinguishing between facilities that were reporting to the TRI in 1990 and those that started to report in later years, we additionally examine the effect of community pressure in prospectively inducing facilities to relocate if they expected to grow and report to TRI in the future. We also compare the characteristics of the destination communities to those of the origin locations to confirm that facilities tend to move "down" the community pressure gradient, and to examine the extent to which post-TRI relocation worsens environmental injustice. Finally, we examine the change in facilities' emission level, employment, and emission per employee following relocation to obtain further insights about the possible motivation for facilities to relocate.
We find that the toxic facilities located in a census tract with higher population density and a larger share of college educated residents were more likely to relocate; a one percent increase in the population density increased the probability of relocation by 0.1%, while an increase in the share of college-educated in a census tract by one percentage point increased that probability by 1.4%. We also find that anticipated community pressures increased the relocation probabilities of facilities that were not reporting in 1990 but increased their emissions in later years. Moreover, we find that relocated toxic facilities tended to move into communities with lower population, lower income, and lower educational attainment.
We also find that relocating facilities did not increase their pollution intensity relative to 5 those not relocated; however, they tended to pollute more because their production levels were growing faster. This is particularly true for facilities moving to locations with weaker community pressure. These findings provide insights into how the reshuffling of existing toxic facilities across communities contributes to worsening environmental injustice following the public disclosure of the TRI.
Conceptual Framework

A Stylized Model
We consider a profit-maximizing facility i (i = 1, 2, ..., I) in location l 0 that is generating toxic releases. In the absence of public information about its pollution, residents in the neighborhood are expected to be unaware or to underestimate a facility's toxic pollution.
At time t p , an information disclosure program is established and starts to publicly disclose information about the magnitude of toxic chemical usage and disposal by facility i and other facilities and generates adverse publicity about them (Hamilton, 1995a; EPA, 2016) .
The response of local communities to this information is likely to vary depending on the composition of the community. High income, highly-educated, politically active, and densely populated communities are expected to have greater capacity for imposing pressure on the toxic facilities by threatening political and regulatory actions and legal liabilities for the damages to health and property values caused by the toxic pollutants and to hamper future expansion of their operations (Hamilton, 1993 (Hamilton, , 1995b Wolverton, 2009 ).
Facility i can respond to the pressure of its local community l 0 by reducing its toxic releases (see evidence in Khanna et al. (1998)) or by shutting down the operations at l 0 and relocating to some other location l 1 at some time t > t p . Facility i will weigh the costs and benefits of staying in l 0 with those of relocating. The benefits of relocating to various alternative locations depend on several factors, including the community pressure that it encounters for emission reduction, access to output and input markets, and the stringency 6 of formal environmental regulations. The costs of relocation include the fixed costs due to the immobility of fixed assets, the transaction costs of rehiring or relocating employees and transporting mobile assets, and the option value of waiting; these costs likely to be facility-specific.
We denote a facility i's profit π ilt at location l at time t by the reduced-form function
where M ilt is the cost to pollution generation imposed on the facility by local community pressure, Z lt is a vector of location-specific economic and regulatory factors that affect the revenues and costs of operations, X ilt is a vector of the facility's characteristics such as size and pollution level that may affect the specific gains and costs of relocation, e ilt includes the unobserved facility-and location-specific factors.
Facility i is expected to select the profit-maximizing level of X * il 0 t when establishing in location l 0 given M il 0 t and Z l 0 t . The location characteristics evolve over time, and the relevance of specific characteristics for a facility's payoff can also change. One such source of the change is the TRI disclosure that can shock the community pressure on toxic facilities. Because of all these changes, facility i can find that location l 0 no longer matches its operating requirements even after adjusting X il 0 t and thus may decide to relocate to some more favorable alternative location l 1 at a relocation cost of C l 0 ,l 1 ,t . Because C l 0 ,l 1 ,t can be substantive, a facility will move only in economic-efficient circumstances, i.e., when the move increases its expected net profit. We denote by r it the binary indicator that equals 1 if facility i relocates at time t, and equals 0 otherwise, and by r * it the expected net benefit of the relocation. It follows that these variables are related through the expressions
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We now discuss the relevant factors for our study that are hypothesized to contribute to the relocation decision of the facility. These factors include community pressure on toxic polluters, other location-specific characteristics, and facility characteristics.
Community Pressure
Facilities emitting toxic chemical pollutants can impose damages on their neighboring communities through various channels. They could generate odors and other nuisances from operations (EPA, 1979) , increase the risk of accidental releases of hazardous waste 10 , raise the probability of health problems for local residents (Currie et al., 2015) , and lower the local property values (Mastromonaco, 2015) . Concerns about these damages can lead local residents to publicly oppose the facilities via direct negotiations, lawsuits, and collective action that force facilities to be "good neighbors" or to compensate for the damages imposed (MacLean & Orum, 1992) . Residents can also lobby the government for indirect regulatory intervention towards those facilities (Earnhart, 2004) . These community reactions can impose costs on the releasing facilities and create incentives for them to relocate to other sites with relatively lower community pressure. We consider several proxies for such community pressure and use them as explanatory variables for the relocation of toxic facilities. They include Population Density, Income Level, Education Attainment, Voter Turnout, and the Share of White. We discuss these proxies below.
We expect a community with a higher level of Population Density, Income, or Education Attainment to impose a higher pressure on toxic facilities to relocate. A densely populated community has a larger number of individuals potentially affected by the environmental damage caused by a facility and hence can impose larger liability on that facility. Empirical analysis by Hamilton (1995b) shows that hazardous-waste generating plants have a lower propensity to expand in population centers. De Silva et al. (2016) also find a negative relationship between the number of TRI-reporting facilities in a community and the size of 10 An illustrative example is the releases from a Union Carbide plant in West Virginia in 1985.
local population.
Rich and high-educated communities can also impose higher pressure on polluters because they are likely to have more high-valued properties and greater awareness and knowledge of the damages caused by toxic releases. As such, they may require greater compensation for the damages imposed by a toxic facility (Hausman, 1993; Roe, Teisl, Levy, & Russell, 2001 ). Existing studies examining the effect of income and education on the location choice of newborn toxic facilities find mixed evidence. Wolverton (2009) finds a negative effect of income and a positive effect of education attainment on the propensity of newborn facilities to locate in a community, whereas De Silva et al. (2016) find an insignificant effect of income and a negative effect of education attainment 11 . These contradictory results reflect the possibility that high education attainment and income likely correlate with other relevant factors for facility location choices, such as skilled labor supply and amenities. However, the effect of these variables on a facility's relocation decision remains to be tested.
Next, we hypothesize that a toxic facility is more likely to relocate from a community that is politically active, as proxied by high Voter Turnout. Hamilton (1993) points out that, in a non-Coasian world, residents in a community usually have to rely on collective actions, e.g. through the political process, to lower the transaction costs of negotiating for emissions reduction or compensation with polluting facilities. Thus, politically active communities tend to impose greater liability on polluters. Hamilton (1995b) finds that communities with higher voter turnout are less likely to have expansions of hazardous-waste generating plants 12 .
Finally, we hypothesize that a toxic facility is more likely to relocate from a community with a small share of minorities (a high Share of White) population. Researchers have documented that race is a good predictor of the location of hazardous facilities (e.g. Commission
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In subsequent work, Schiller, McComb, and Slechten (2018) beak up facilities into those that are currently emitting toxic pollutants, and those that are in the same industry but are not currently emitting. The prevalence of the former is monotonically increasing in local per capita income, while the latter exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to local per capita income. 12 Voter turnout might increase the propensity of firms to locate in an area if residents value the resulting employment increase more than the associated pollution. This might explain the findings in Wolverton (2009) where Texas communities with higher voter turnout were more likely to attract new toxic facilities.
Racial Justice (1987)), but explanations for this phenomenon in the current literature vary.
Proponents of a Coasian model suggest that minority communities are vulnerable because they lack financial resources and the capability to hold collective actions to influence toxic polluters (Hamilton, 1995b) . Empirical tests from Hamilton (1995b) and Wolverton (2009) support this hypothesis and show no significant effect of race but a significant effect of income and political factors on the location choice of toxic facilities. However, others explain this phenomenon by suggesting that entrepreneurs and government regulators are racially prejudiced (possibly sub-consciously). De Silva et al. (2016) and Mohai and Saha (2015) find a statistically significant effect of race on the location choice of toxic facilities even after controlling for income level and political activeness of communities 13 . Given the mixed evidence, we include the Share of White in our analysis as an additional check on the relationship between race and the relocation choice of toxic facilities 14 .
Location-specific Characteristics
We control for various location-specific characteristics that can explain the relocation decision of toxic-releasing facilities. In addition to the effects of community pressure, the profitability of operating a facility at some location can also be influenced by the stringency of local environmental regulations and the local economic conditions. These factors can influence the facility's pollution abatement and production costs.
Formal environmental regulations, either targeted at toxic chemicals or other regulated pollutants, can lead to inspections and penalties by local environmental agencies on a toxic-13 There is also evidence opposing both the theories. Downey (2005) finds neither race nor income have a significant impact on the location of toxic facilities after controlling for important economic factors. Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser (1994) claim that toxic plants may choose areas that are urban and with more industrial activities regardless of demographic composition; minorities and low-income residents are only attracted later from the presence of increased job opportunities and lower priced housing. 14 Some research like Cole, Elliott, and Wang (2013) also consider the effect of ethnic fractionalization of communities on the polluting behavior of toxic facilities. They argue that the presence of diversity in ethnic groups can increase the language barrier and cultural difference in a community and thus limit the ability of the community to hold collective actions against the polluters. We included the index Cole et al. (2013) used to represent the ethnic fractionalization of communities and tested its effect on the likelihood of facilities' relocation. Our results did not show a statistically significant effect of this factor. releasing facility. Existing or anticipated threats can increase the facility compliance costs by requiring the adoption of a costly environmental management system or specific technologies (Khanna & Anton, 2002) . These additional costs lower profits and can lead polluters to relocate to places with less stringent regulations. We use the Attainment Status of a county to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) as a proxy for the environmental regulatory stringency on a facility. The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires counties with a nonattainment status to be subjected to additional controls, and that includes forcing polluting plants in those counties to comply with a more stringent emission standard and use cleaner but more expensive technologies 15 . These requirements lower profits and make those counties less attractive to relocating facilities, as is shown by List, McHone, and Millimet (2003) . Becker and Henderson (2000) also find a smaller number of new manufacturing plants born in non-attainment counties.
Economic conditions such as the availability and cost of labor and access to suppliers can also affect the desirability of specific locations. The cost of labor is an important determinant of the production cost of manufacturing firms and has been found to be a significant factor influencing plants' location choice (Levinson, 1996a) . Using the average Wage Rate of production workers to measure the labor cost, Bartik (1985) and Wolverton (2009) find a negative relationship between the level of local labor cost and the propensity of a toxicreleasing plant to locate in a community. Another relevant factor is the density of existing toxic facilities in a community, as it correlates with local agglomeration benefits such as easier access to suppliers and an industrially skilled labor pool (Puga, 2010) . It also signals relative acceptability of pollution in an area (Wolverton, 2009) . De Silva et al. (2016) shows that new toxic facilities in Texas tend to locate into census tracts with a larger number of 15 The NAAQS has standards on six criteria pollutants, including the ozone, N O x , SO 2 , CO, PM2.5, and PM10. The CAA requires an attainment status for each of the pollutants separately. We treat a county as "non-attainment" when either of the six pollutants shows non-attainment. We use the attainment status as a measurement on the general regulatory pressure on the facilities and do not focus on the effect of specific pollutant. Most of the facilities emitting toxic chemicals also generate emission of the criteria pollutants and thus could subjected to the regulation of CAA. However, we did not find any specific relationship between the amount or category of toxic chemical releases and criteria pollutant releases.
pre-existing toxic facilities. We adopt the De Silva et al. (2016) measure of industrial density by using the Number of Existing Toxic Facilities in a community.
Facility Characteristics
The relocation decision of a facility is also affected by its ability to bear the relocation cost and to benefit from the move, which are both to a large extent facility-specific and depend on facility characteristics (Grant, Trautner, Downey, & Thiebaud, 2010; Holl, 2004; Schmenner, 1980) . We consider three facility-specific characteristics that may affect the costs and benefits of relocation.
The first factor is Size. Small facilities typically have a small number of employees, a simple organization, and few fixed production assets. These characteristics suggest a low relocating cost: it is easier to hire and train new workers, replace equipment, and search for an appropriate destination site since more sites could potentially accommodate the facility (McCann, 2001) . Smaller facilities may also have lower local support to prevent relocation to avoid loss of jobs because they have a small number of employees (Pargal, Hettige, Singh, & Wheeler, 1997) . Van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2000) examine the migration of firms in the Netherland and find that small-sized firms (measured by the number of employees) have a higher tendency to relocate. Brouwer, Mariotti, and van Ommeren (2004) survey firms in 21 European countries and also find a negative relationship between firms' size and their relocation tendency.
The second factor is the Financial Health of the parent firm. Firms that are not financially strong can have a larger incentive to move their manufacturing into locations with lower production costs. Many studies have found that financial markets reacted positively in the stock price when a business announced relocation with a goal of cost-savings or increased operational efficiency (Chan, Gau, & Wang, 1995; Ghosh, Rodriguez, & Sirmans, 1995) . However, a weak financial standing can also limit the ability of businesses to pay for the (often substantial) relocating cost if it cannot obtain external finance, and limit the likelihood of relocation (Van Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000) . The two opposing effects result in an ambiguous effect of the financial health on the propensity of a facility to relocate (see Hu, Cox, Wright, and Harris (2008) for empirical evidence).
The third factor is the Toxic Emission Level. Direct community pressure and indirect regulatory pressure are likely to be stronger on facilities with larger toxic releases. Many studies have shown that facilities with larger toxic releases suffered a heavier financial loss after the TRI disclosure (Hamilton, 1995a; Konar & Cohen, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998) .
Because relocation can be an alternative to emission abatement as a way to reduce local community pressure and regulatory scrutiny, large polluters could have a strong incentive to relocate. But on the other hand, large polluters are also more able to resist community pressure and counter residents' and workers' claims (Cable, Shriver, & Mix, 2008) . Equally importantly, large polluters may be subject to higher costs of relocation, not least because there are fewer locations which could be suitable physically and whose residents would be willing to accommodate them. Therefore, we expect a more complex relationship between the toxic emission level and relocation propensity.
Empirical Model
Our empirical model builds on equation (2) and predicts relocation, r it , using a reduced-form discrete choice model with vectors of community characteristics M l 0 t , other location-specific factors Z l 0 t , and facility characteristics X il 0 t as exogenous variables to explain the likelihood of relocation by facility i from location l 0 at time t. The underlying latent variable, r * it , is given by
where e il 0 t is a disturbance term and r it = 1 if r * it > 0 and zero otherwise. The main difference between this specification and the framework described in Section 2 is that destination characteristics and relocation costs are absent from equation (3). Destination characteristics are only available for the subset of facilities that did relocate (and are used in Section 7).
To arrive at specification (3), the implicit assumption is that the expected payoff in the best alternative location and the cost of relocation are both linear functions of current location and facility characteristics (possibly with zero slopes with respect to some variables) 16 . Then, the estimated coefficient for each of the variables in equation (3) is the net contribution of that variable to the expected payoff in the best alternative location minus the opportunity payoff of staying in a location minus the cost of relocation. It is in this sense that our analysis is reduced-form; we interpret our results accordingly. We next describe each variable set, before returning to the estimation of our empirical model.
We define a community as a census tract and a "relocation" as a move by a facility across census tracts or counties (depending on specification). The community characteristics (M lt ) as proxies for the community pressure are also mostly measured at the census tract level (except for voter turnout). We measure Population Density by the total population per square mile, Income by per capita income in thousands of dollars, and Education Attainment by the share of residents with a bachelor or higher degree. Compared to other narrow geographical units such as zip codes, the census tract has relatively stable boundaries over time (Been & Gupta, 1997) and therefore can be used to compare community characteristics consistently over years. Census tract level data also provide a reasonable approximation to the neighborhood characteristics of the area directly affected by the toxic releases of facilities and thus of the geographic area within which a facility might experience the effects of pressure from the local community 17 . We cluster standard errors at the census tract level to adjust for the non-independence in facilities' behavior in the same location due to the potential demonstration effect among collocated facilities on environmental management, knowledge spillovers that may affect relocation (Gray & Shadbegian, 2007) , and other common locationspecific factors.
The location-specific economic and regulatory characteristics (Z l 0 t ) as well as the Voter Turnout are measured at the county-level because of data restrictions. However, as Hamilton (1995b) has pointed out, the relevant geography for a firm's labor inputs is usually broader than a census tract and can extend to a county or broader region 18 . Because of the coarseness of the county-level data, we examine the cross-county and within-county relocations separately and only include the county-level explanatory variables in the regressions explaining cross-county moves. The analysis of within county moves is particularly important because they are clearly not driven by unobserved regulatory or economic considerations at a broader market scale, since these are largely invariant within a county.
The elements of (X il 0 t ) are all characteristics measured at the facility-level. We measure the Size of facilities using the number of employees and the Financial Health of facilities using the PayDex Score, a credit score similar to the FICO score for individuals but measured based on the payment history of businesses 19 . Our data provide the max and min value of the PayDex score of a business in each year, with a low score in either value indicating a higher probability of delayed payments of debt 20 . We use the max PayDex score to control for the status of a facility's payment capacity and additionally include the difference between the max and min as another proxy to control for the variations in the score which represents 18 The average home-to-work commuting distance (one-way) of the US working class is about 15 miles according to the US Census in 2000. This distance is larger than the length of most census tracts' radius. Facilities could also compensate employees for house moving. Therefore, the available labor pool for a facility should not be restricted to the local census tract. 19 Some studies in the literature (e.g. Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) ) use both employment and sales to measure of business size, in order to control for the input and output dimensions of a facility's operations. However, we only have a small portion of facilities with independently reported sales data; for the rest, their sales data were estimated from the employment data. This reduces the value of including sales as an additional proxy for Size in our analysis. 20 A PayDex score of 80 indicates an on-time payment. A score higher than 80 means a payment ahead of the due date. Details of the methods for calculating the PayDex score can be found at https://www.nav.com/business-credit-scores/dun-bradstreet-paydex/.
short-run volatility in the firm's finances 21 .
For the Toxic Emission Level, we use the total toxic releases generated by aggregating the releases of each chemical reported to TRI by the facility. We do not weigh chemicals by toxicity following the results from Arora and Cason (1999) , who find that most chemicals on the TRI list have similar toxicity and that the response of facilities' total releases to the local community demographics is not sensitive to the weighting scheme. The Toxic Emission
Level is left-censored as the TRI program only requires facilities to report if their emissions of a chemical exceed a threshold. We treat the missing values in the Toxic Emission Level as zero but add a binary indicator Zero-Emission in the regressions. In this way, these facilities do not impact our estimates of the marginal effect of emissions on firm behavior above the threshold. This variable also accounts for the possibility that facilities that are not emitting in a particular year (or period) are qualitatively different than those that are emitting. Because emission levels differ markedly across facilities, with the largest emitters emitting many times the level of the typical emitter, we use a linear spline to allow the Toxic Emission Level to enter the model in a flexible manner, and allow the emission level to have a nonlinear effect on the relocation propensity of facilities.
In the specification described by equation (3), the coefficient vector β is of primary interest. It predicts the direction of the relationship between the community characteristics M lt and the likelihood of facility relocation. An important concern in identifying β is the possibility of reverse causality, as households may also "vote with their feet" in response to the presence of toxic facilities, so that location demographics are determined by facility siting decisions rather than vice versa (Tiebout, 1956) . We avoid this problem by using the 1990 value of the community demographics, M l1990 , to explain relocation after 1990. As such, the demographic characteristics predate the relocation decision of facilities and can be treated as exogenous. To examine the heterogeneity of β between heavy and light polluters, we also include in some specifications the interaction of the Toxic Emission Level with the community characteristics M l1990 .
We estimate two versions of the model in equation (3) via logit regression. First, we explain a facility's cumulative probability of relocation over a period after the first TRI disclosure. The model uses M l1990 and other covariates evaluated at 1990 to predict the likelihood of relocating within T years after 1990. We set the value of T years. We set the value of T at 5, 10 and 20 years. Defining by R iT the indicator variable for relocation within T years of 1990, the specification becomes
The unit of observation is individual facility; thus, this regression is of a cross-sectional nature. The model includes state fixed effects λ s l to control for the unobserved state characteristics such as local tax policies, transportation networks, and amenities that have been shown in the literature to influence facilities' relocation decision. We did not use fixed effects at a finer spatial scale because many districts below the state level do not experience any facility relocation during the sampling period, and as a result, adding county or lower-level dummies would effectively eliminate a large part of our sample. We also include industry fixed effects λ k i to control for unobserved industry-specific differences in business relocation.
We then estimate a panel model that explains the annual probability of relocation and which adds time variation for some of the covariates. The community characteristics M l1990 are still measured in 1990 given that most of these characteristics are only available in census years, and interpolating values would be subject to the reverse causality concern 22 . This model is given by:
where r it in the panel model is a binary indicator of whether a facility i relocated in year t 23 . The facility-specific (X it−1 ) and other location-specific (Z lt−1 ) characteristics are time varying and lagged by one year since relocation decisions are executed with a lag. We also include year fixed effects λ t to control for the influence of unobserved year-specific events, e.g. the 2008 financial crisis which was followed by a sharp increase in the relocation rate of facilities over several years.
Data and Sample
The sample consists of manufacturing facilities that reported to the TRI at least once during 1990 to 2011 and also have their location data collected by the Duns and Bradstreet (DB) database over the same period. The Duns and Bradstreet data are obtained from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database (Walls, 2011) which did an annual snapshot of the DB data. The NETS database provides information on the location and relocation history, size, industry, and other characteristics of business establishments from 1990 to 2011. It identifies relocation by comparing the address of a facility in year t and year t + 1 and sets relocation at time t if the census tract in the addresses of the two years are different. The TRI data provide facility-level information about the amount of toxic chemical releases, the facility name, address, and industry SIC code in each year since its first public disclosure in mid-1989. Not all facilities existed before 1990 in our sample reported to the TRI when it was first disclosed; 36% of the facilities began reporting to the TRI after 1990. 23 We use the records of non-relocated facilities and the records of relocated facilities before relocation to predict the relocation decision of facilities. This model is similar to a hazard model with a probability of move that is independent of the facility's age (a hazard model also has a different assumption on the error term in the latent variable model). We did not estimate a duration model because we have no information about the establishment year of the facility.
We merge the TRI and the NETS data by matching their common information on the facilities' name, address, and 8-digit SIC code. Of the full set of 51,620 facilities reporting to the TRI during the sampling period, we were able to match 70.1% with the NETS data 24 . Of the remaining facilities, we dropped the ones born after 1990, as their initial location choice was affected by the availability of TRI data which may also impact the need for subsequent relocation. We also dropped the facilities with missing data for the locations where they were sited. As compared to the sample of all facilities that have ever reported to TRI, the facilities in our sample have a similar mean and median of toxic releases, and also similar values at other percentiles.
The data on population density, per capita income, education level, and racial composi- values, as some facilities stay in the sample for different number of years and others change 24 The TRI does not track facilities over their lifetime. The TRIFID, which is the identification number for each TRI-reported facility in the database, is attached to locations instead of facilities. It will change when a facility relocates and can be reassigned to another facility if one is established in the same location.
We thus cannot identify the number of owner-specific facilities in the TRI dataset using its system of identification. There are 51,620 TRIFIDs in the raw TRI data from 1990 to 2011. Technical details about this identification system and on the methods for merging the data are provided in the Appendix. Further information is available from the authors upon request.
locations during the period of study. Table 1 shows that relocation is more likely to occur in communities with higher population density, income level, education attainment, and also higher propensity to be in non-attainment to the NAAQS. The wage rate and employment level are also on average higher in the communities of the relocated facilities. However, the share of white and the number of existing TRI facilities in those communities are lower. Table 1 also shows that relocated facilities are on average smaller and emit less than non-relocated facilities, whereas their emission intensity with respect to the labor inputs are not significantly different. Finally, relocated facilities tend to have lower and more volatile PayDex score. Table 2 presents the results that explain the cumulative relocation probability of a facility within T years after 1990. Columns (1) to (4) show the results for T = 10 and Columns (5) to (8) show the results for T = 20 25 . We find robust and statistically significant evidence for a positive effect of Population Density and Education Attainment, two proxies for the local community pressure, on the likelihood of facility relocation. The effect of another proxy, Income Level, is also found to be positive and statistically significant on the likelihood of a facility relocation within 10 years but not significant for relocation within 20 years. The effect of the Share of White is not statistically significant in most specifications. This accords with the findings from Hamilton (1995b) and Wolverton (2009) and provides no support for the hypothesis of discrimination by the owners of toxic facilities against minorities in their location decisions. We also do not find a significant effect of Voter Turnout on the likelihood of relocation. Recalling that voter turnout and other location characteristics are measured at the county level and thus exhibit no variation for within-county moves, we split relocations into cross-county and within-county moves and run the regressions separately on the two sub-samples 26 . In the results shown in Table 3 , Voter Turnout shows a negative effect on the likelihood of cross-county relocation, and the effect is significant at the 90% level for relocation within 20 years. The negative sign and the weak significance reflect the complicated impact of political activism regarding to both pollution and jobs on the relocation of toxic facilities, as discussed earlier. Population Density and Education Attainment on the relocation propensity of facilities at the means of other variables. We find that a 1% increase in the population density and 1 percentage point increase the share of high-educated residents of a census tract in 1990
Results
increase the annual relocation probability of a toxic facility by 0.1% and 1.4%, respectively.
These effects, compared with the average annual relocation rate of 0.85% in the sample, are economically significant. The result shows that populated and high-educated communities are more likely to drive polluters out and suggests that local community pressure has a significant impact on the relocation decision of toxic-releasing facilities.
Our results provide only weak support for the notion that facilities with larger volume of emissions are more likely to relocate due to community pressure compared to those emitting a smaller amount of emissions. We construct linear splines of the Toxic Emission Level with four knots. The first knot of the spline is set at the 65th percentile of the emission distribution, a high value, because the distribution is highly right-skewed; The other three knots are at the 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles. In the results shown in Table 2 and Table   3 , we find that most of the spline slopes are not statistically significant. There are only some significant and negative effects for the 90th to 95th percentile and a weak positive significant effect for the 75th to 90th percentiles on within-county relocation. Similar results are obtained for the panel regression counterparts. These results provide weak evidence that the relocation probability is somewhat higher for the large polluters but not the largest ones, which might be constrained by high relocation costs.
There is, however, some minimal evidence showing that the largest polluters have a greater propensity to relocate when facing greater community pressure. Table 5 presents the results of the regressions that include the interactions between the spline of the Toxic Emission Level and the community demographic factors. Results in Column (4), (11), and (12) show that facilities in the 95th and higher percentile of the emission level are more likely to relocate within a county if they are located in areas with high Population Density or with high Education Attainment 27 . These within-county moves are important because they cannot be explained by access to markets or inputs.
While the linear splines of the emission level mostly show insignificant effects, the ZeroEmission dummy shows a positive and significant effect in all specifications. The positive sign indicates that facilities without emissions or with emissions below the TRI reporting threshold are more likely to relocate. This does not necessarily signal a higher sensitivity of small polluters to community pressure, as the interaction terms between Zero-Emission and the community characteristics in Table 5 show little significance. We find that these facilities have lower employment and sales than facilities with positive emissions, indicating their relatively small production scale and possibly young age with potential for growth (and need for a different site). These producers are also likely to have smaller costs of relocation because of their negligible current pollution level which imply a smaller liability to clean-up toxic pollution at the original site (Levinson, 1996b) and may also find it easier to obtain the necessary permits to locate at a new site. These factors could explain the higher propensity of small polluters to relocate.
27 The interaction of the spline with the demographic characteristics is done one demographic characteristic at a time to reduce collinearity. Even so, the results are generally not significant.
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The county Attainment Status, as a proxy for the local environmental regulatory pressure, consistently shows a positive impact on the likelihood of relocation across county lines.
The Wage Rate and the Employment Level both show a positive correlation with relocation, indicating that facilities are more likely to leave from locations with high labor costs. Facilities that are moving within counties are also less likely to relocate from a census tract that has a higher density of existing toxic facilities. Among the facility characteristics, the number of employees shows a negative and statistically significant effect on both the crosscounty and within-county relocation of facilities, consistent with the literature that shows a lower relocation tendency of large-sized facilities that have a heavy burden of relocating costs. We also find in the panel regression that the PayDex score (Max -Min) and PayDex score (Max), both serving to measure the Financial Health, show a significant positive and negative effect on the likelihood of relocation, respectively. This implies that facilities with unstable and low business credits have a higher propensity to relocate.
We now investigate the possibility that facilities respond to TRI reporting prospectively, i.e., their relocation propensity is affected by the anticipation of reporting to the TRI rather than current inclusion in the TRI. We therefore identify the first year in which each facility in our sample reported to the TRI; in prior years, its emissions were below the threshold for the reported chemicals 28 . We defined an indicator variable that takes a value of one for the years preceding a facility's first report to the TRI. For those years, the facility would be "invisible" to those browsing the TRI database. These facilities will become visible at a later point in time, when they exceed the TRI reporting threshold for one or more chemicals and are included in the TRI database. We added this indicator with and without its interactions with the size of the facility and selected demographic characteristics to the panel specifications in Column (2) and (4) of Table 4 29 . In these regressions, the coefficient 28 The list of included chemicals was expanded in 2001 to include lead and lead compounds, which led to the inclusion of approximately 3% of our sample. In 1998, seven industries were added to TRI, including metal mining, coal mining, electric utilities, affecting the inclusion of another 3% of our sample in that year. Both additions to the database operate in the same fashion as increases in emissions above the reporting level: they were partially anticipated future inclusions of facilities that were not included in prior years. 29 Since the indicator variable on reporting history is time varying, using it in the cross-section regressions is of this indicator variable and its interaction compares the annual relocation probability of facilities that have not yet ever reported but will report in the future with that of the facilities that are not currently reporting, have reported in the past, and may or may not report in the future. This interpretation of the coefficient of this indicator variable follows from the observation that we also include a dummy variable (Zero-Emission) for facilities that are not reporting now, regardless of the prior and future reporting studies.
The results are presented in Table 7 . The point estimate for the indicator for not yet having reported is positive, and the effect is stronger for denser and more educated localities.
Facilities that are not yet "on the radar" but anticipate that they will be in the future should indeed be more likely to depart from high community pressure locations compared to facilities whose emissions have dropped below the threshold and may not go above it again. If firms are forward looking, the former group would expect higher future levels of community pressure for its activities compared to the later. With relocation taking place on the basis of future payoffs, it is the expected pressure that matters, not any pressure that the facility has faced in the past.
Comparison between Origins and Destinations
A relocating facility could in principle move to any location in the United States. But quite clearly, a firm does not consider all 74,000+ census tracts in the US as possible destinations;
Even if it did, formulating and estimating a suitable discrete choice model with that many alternatives would be a daunting exercise 30 . In the absence of information about each facility's choice set or about how these choice sets are determined, we adopt a different approach based on the observations that (i) a moving facility relocates if it derives a higher payoff from being in the new location than remaining in the old one, and (ii) there is a sufficiently large not meaningful. 30 Discrete choice methods for location choice, such as those using a conditional logit model, are far more conceptually appealing and computationally tractable for studies that focus on a narrower geographic scope (e.g. List et al. (2003) ).
number of possible destinations that the choice set can be approximated by a continuum with respect to the relevant location characteristics we consider in our analysis.
Suppose the advent of the TRI changed the trade-off between a socioeconomic characteristic associated with higher community pressure and the location's other characteristics by making that characteristic "more expensive." Then, we would expect the optimal bundle of characteristics in the new location to have less of the more expensive community features.
Of course, not all facilities would choose to move to the new optimal location because of the presence of fixed costs. But those that do choose to move because the benefits outweigh the costs (possibly for reasons unrelated to environmental considerations) would "buy" a location with less of the expensive characteristics 31 .
Based on this reasoning, we compare the values of each of the five community demographics and the Attainment Status in the new and old locations via pairwise t-tests and identify the characteristics whose value has decreased. To examine the heterogeneity in the destination choices among the facilities, the t-test on the differences is conducted separately for the small polluters, recognized as those with no TRI reported emission before moving, and the polluters with positive reported emission. Table 8a presents the results. We find that facilities are on average relocating into communities with lower population density, lower income level, and lower propensity of being non-attainment under NAAQS, especially for the cross-county movers. This relocation tendency is stronger for the small polluters, which also relocate into communities with lower education attainment and lower voter turnout.
In contrast, large polluters are found to relocate into communities with higher education attainment and higher voter turnout. Facilities are also found to relocate into communities with a higher share of white residents.
The above results show that for large polluters, some characteristics associated with higher community pressure have smaller values in the new locations, but not all of them do. This could be due to two possible reasons. One is that these characteristics are also associated with higher benefits for large facilities, compared to earlier years. For example, large facilities may be more complex and require a more highly trained workforce, or may obtain special incentives to choose a particular location, explaining their pattern of relocation towards locations with higher educational attainment and voter turnout. Another possibility is that the choice set is not as dense in terms of the combination of characteristics, especially for large facilities that have more stringent siting requirements, e.g., infrastructure and access to suppliers. Thus, their location choice involves trade-offs between the various observable characteristics.
To address the second possibility, we construct an index score that integrates all the five proxies in one statistic to examine the "overall" effect of community pressure on the location choice of the toxic facilities. The statistic is based on the premise that, even though a facility cannot choose any value of all individual characteristics at its new location, its set of choices is continuous in the index statistic, i.e., it is continuous after we allow for trade-offs between the characteristics. We take the estimated coefficients of the community characteristics (β)
from Column (2), (4), and (6) of Table 4 as weights, and calculate the location score as the weighted summation of the level of those characteristics for the relocating origins (βM l 0 ) and destinations (βM l 1 ). Table 8b presents the pairwise comparisons between the origin and destination scores. We find that both small and large polluters are on average relocating into communities with significantly lower score for community pressure. The only exception are large polluters moving across counties, for which the change is not statistically significant, possibly for the reasons discussed earlier in this paragraph.
Facility Performance Pre-and Post-Relocation
An open question related to our findings is whether relocation is associated with changes in the environmental performance of facilities. We briefly explore this issue using pairwise t-tests to examine the change in the facilities' emission level, employment, and emission 26 per employee following relocation. Emissions are somewhat volatile and may be transiently affected by the relocation process. Therefore, we use the average of three years following the post-relocation year and the average of the three years preceding the pre-relocation year in making the comparisons 32 . Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9 show the changes in levels of those performance outcomes, while Columns (4) to (6) show these changes in logs 33 . We calculate the changes by subtracting the value of an outcome in the destination location by its value in the original location. We also conduct the test separately for small and large polluters, partitioned on the basis of their pre-move emission levels.
Comparisons of a facility before and after moving involve a simultaneous comparison across time, in fact one that spans 9 years given that we use multi-year averages and omit the years adjacent to the relocation year. Therefore, any secular trends in emissions might be mistaken for changes due to the relocation. A proper comparison would be of a differencein-difference nature, which we perform by computing changes in these variables from placebo moves. For each facility that has not moved, we randomly assign a hypothetical "moving" year and compute the "change" in its emissions and employment around that year in the same manner that we would have if the facility had moved. We observe from the placebo moves that facilities tend to reduce emissions and employment over time, and also reduce emissions per employee. These trends are not surprising given the US trend towards more automated and cleaner industrial facilities. This pattern is not present for the facilities that 32 When a facility has moved less than four years before the start or end period of our sample, we use all available years to calculate the facility's employment, emissions, and emissions per employee. This happens for 23% of the relocated facilities. However, we did not use the facilities with only one-year data before or after moving (8%) when calculating the figures reported in Table 9 because that one year of data preceding or following the relocation may contain excessive noise. 33 Some facilities report zero emissions for some years during the window used for calculating changes in emissions. These facilities constitute for 6.7% of the sample (N = 210), and all observations involving them have been dropped when computing the figures for Columns (4) and (6). Facilities not report to the TRI because their emissions are below the reporting threshold constitute a larger portion of our data; observations involving them exceed 60% of our data, and thus it is not practical to eliminate all of them. Instead, we assume (but only for the purpose of Table 9 ) that their emissions level is at the reporting threshold of 0.5 thousand pounds. For consistency of calculations in this table, we did the same when calculating ∆Emis and ∆Emis per Emp. This substitution may lead to an upward bias in ∆Emis, ∆Emis per Emp, ∆log(Emis) and ∆log(Emis per Emp), because the percentage of facilities with nonreported emission levels after relocation exceeds the corresponding percentage before relocation by 20.3%.
are not initially reporting any emissions. Given the zero-lower bound, the emissions of these facilities cannot possibly go down and may go up; These facilities are also relatively small to begin with and thus do not exhibit any reduction in employment. Because of the dispersion in the size and emissions of facilities, the figures in levels exhibit relatively large standard errors. The log changes, which reflect percentages and put all facilities in a similar scale, exhibit much smaller standard errors. We will thus generally focus our discussion on the comparison between placebo moves and actual moves in the log changes.
The placebo changes form the basis of comparison for the performance effects of actual movers. Compared to these, we find that movers exhibit smaller reductions in emissions accompanied by an increase in employment. Emissions per employee follow the same trend as non-movers. It seems that moving facilities tend to grow; possibly the move is driven by a desire to increase the scale of production. Because they grow, they also emit more, but their pollution intensity is not affected. Facilities with no emissions prior to the relocation grow in size and emissions even more than the larger relocating facilities. But their emissions intensity exhibits the same trend.
A natural question is whether the performance effects associated with relocation within a county are different than those across county-lines. There seems to be little evidence that they do. However, a clear pattern emerges when we distinguish moves based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the destination locations relative to the socioeconomic characteristics of the origin locations. We have used the changes in demographic characteristics of the locations weighted by the parameter estimates of Column (2) of Table 4 to construct summary indexes associated with changes in community pressure. We find that facilities relocating to areas with lower community pressure grow more than those relocating to areas with higher community pressure, and their emissions change are much higher than those of the non-relocating facilities with placebo moves. In contrast, facilities that relocate to areas with higher community pressure exhibit a growth pattern in employment and emissions more similar to the non-relocators.
All these findings, taken together, suggest that relocation is associated with facility growth and thus also with an increase in emissions. But emissions per employee do not change differentially for relocating facilities compared to those who stay in the same location. Thus, it appears that facilities do not relocate to become "dirtier"; they relocate when they want to grow. When they do, they choose to move down the socioeconomic gradient. Moreover, the increases in employment and emissions are more pronounced for facilities moving into more disadvantaged communities, but even in those cases emission intensity does not increase. In brief, the adverse effects on environmental injustice arise from the relocation pattern itself and the fact that it is associated with facility (and emissions) growth, not from changes in facility behavior conditional on size.
Conclusion
Environmental disclosure programs are meant to correct informational asymmetries and increase welfare by helping communities take actions based on solid facts. The notion that more information can increase efficiency is seductive, but might be erroneous. If the disclosure programs increase information but do so differentially across communities, they will lead to information asymmetries between them. Moreover, some communities may be better able to organize based on the information they receive and more effective in obtaining a response from policy makers. As a result, information disclosure may well lead to adverse outcomes for those "disadvantaged" communities and might potentially reduce welfare for their residents.
Though we cannot perform welfare analysis with the data in our disposal, we are able to provide evidence of detrimental outcomes for communities of low socioeconomic status.
One channel through which these adverse effects materialize is the relocation of toxic facilities from communities of high socioeconomic status to those of low socioeconomic status.
Toxic facilities are more likely to relocate from communities with high population density 29 and high education attainment. The causes of relocation may include community pressure arising from greater information availability, but quite likely other factors that are more important. The facilities that do relocate tend to move into communities with lower population density, income, and education attainment. This "migration" of toxic facilities down the socioeconomic gradient results in adverse distribution effects.
Our results show that facilities that are not yet reporting to the TRI but anticipate that they will be in the future are also likely to depart from high community pressure locations.
This implies that environmental disclosure programs not only affect existing facilities but also have an anticipatory effect on location choices of facilities that expect to increase their emissions in the future. On a more positive note, we do find that relocation does not appear to have been associated with facilities becoming dirtier and increasing emissions per employee; instead, it appears to be motivated by a desire for growth by facilities. However, the growth does indicate that relocation can be expected to increase emissions, especially for communities with disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, for which post-relocation facility growth is particularly high.
Overall, our findings provide empirical evidence that the public disclosure of TRI has a negative side effect on environmental injustice by inducing facilities to relocate into socioeconomically disadvantaged areas and potentially increasing their toxic emissions. These findings have direct implications for the design and implementation of information disclosure programs such as the TRI. Policy makers need to consider the potential side effect of such a regulatory tool on distributional justice and strengthen the channels for vulnerable populations to voice their concerns about facility location in addition to strengthening zoning laws and regulations. We treat facilities relocated within counties as non-relocated facilities when calculating the means in Column (5).
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The income level and wage rate are converted to constant 2012 dollars using the CPI from 1990 to 2011. 
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(8) Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
∆X = M ean(X)After
Move − M ean(X)Before Moves to lower pressure include the relocated facilities with the pressure score change in the bottom third of the score changes among all movers. Movers to higher pressure include the relocated facilities with the pressure score change in the top third of the changes among all movers. Z1, Z2,β follow the same definition as the Table 8 .
Appendix. Details on Merging TRI Data with the NETS Data
The ID for Facilities in TRI and NETS
The US EPA uses TRIFID to identify the facilities reporting to the TRI. TRIFID is location-specific and is not unique to facilities during their lifetime. Once a facility moves, its TRIFID will be changed, and the initial TRIFID may be reassigned to others that took the facility's old physical location. Because TRIFID is not facility-specific, we cannot identify the number of facilities reporting to TRI based on these IDs but have to rely on the IDs in the NETS data, called DUNSnumber, which is facility-specific and never reassigned.
We merge the records of TRI with the NETS records year by year. This is because a TRIFID is attached to a unique facility in a specific year, so the compound ID, TRIFID + year, can be used to uniquely identify records in the TRI.
Match the IDs in TRI and NETS
Our main reference to combine the TRI and the NETS database is a cross-walk file from the NETS data provider, the Walls company. The file contains two columns, with one for TRIFID and the other for DUNSnumber, and each row tells how to pair one DUNSnumber with a TRIFID. The NETS data provider generates the cross-walk by matching the common information in the TRI and NETS on facilities' street address, name, 8-digit SIC code, and the parent company's name. Specifically, it first treats a business that has the same street address and can be uniquely identified by the address in both NETS and TRI as the same business; then, if the street address is too coarse to uniquely identify a business in either dataset, it turns to the address + name of the business and redoes the identification and matching. If still fails, it then turns to address + name + 8-digit SIC code, and so on.
This matching is incomplete; many facilities in NETS and the TRI are not included in the cross-walk.
We are able to match some of these facilities using their geographic coordinates rounded to 4 (or 3, or 2) decimal points. We add DUNSnumber to TRIFID match to the cross-walk if both the TRI and NETS databases both contain only one unmatched facility with the specified co-ordinates. This approach catches facilities that have a small difference in the street address in the two datasets but are actually the same facility (e.g. a facility may have an address of "12-345 ABC street" in TRI data but "12345 ABC street" in NETS data). It allows to match an additional 0.2% of the TRIFIDs. This geographic matching can also generate many-to-many matches, because of facility relocation and recycling of TRIFIDs.
Importantly, the cross-walk file does not contain a year column, even though the TRIFID to facility mapping is in principle many-to-many. Therefore, the cross-walk mapping is also many-to-many. Such multiple matches can be generated in 3 ways:
1) A TRI-reporting facility relocated and continued reporting to TRI after relocating. This facility will have two TRIFIDs in TRI but only one DUNSnumber in NETS, thus resulting in a "two-to-one" match. We can determine the temporal order of the two TRIFIDs using the information in "TRIFID + year" and obtain a one-to-one mapping of the annual records facilities in the TRI and the NETS. We found that some relocated facilities only have TRIFID before or after moving, and the TRI records end or start exactly at the relocation year. One possibility is that the facility only reaches the threshold of TRI reporting before or after moving and thus we do not have records in both pre-and post-relocation periods. The other possibility is a missing match of the facility's DUNSnumber with its TRI records after or before the move. If this is the case, the missing records should be attached to another TRIFID. We manually searched the TRI dataset for all these relocated facilities by their name, address, and zip-code to fulfill these potential missing records as much as possible.
2) TRIFID can be recycled and reassigned, so one TRIFID can be paired with multiple DUNSnumber values in different years. We use the temporal information in TRI to identify which years' records under a TRIFID should be matched with a specific DUNSnumber. An example of such scenario is shown in Figure A -2. 3) A "facility" defined in NETS is not exactly identical to the "facility" in TRI. Some facilities in NETS may contain several facilities in TRI and or the other way around. The number of facilities with this kind of problem however is quite small (less than 0.1% of the sample), we therefore choose to drop these businesses from the sample given the difficulty of aggregating data like the relocation information across facilities.
Correction of Inconsistent Matches
After the matching, we end up with a panel dataset of facilities each identified by a unique DUNSnumber and having at least one TRI record during our sample period. Nevertheless, we find some inconsistencies in 45 this merged dataset between the information from NETS and TRI.
First, some facilities whose NETS address has changed (and thus considered relocated) continue to report in the TRI under the old TRIFID, which contradicts with the EPA's rule of changing TRIFID with re-location. One possibility is that the relocation did happen, and the old TRIFID was re-assigned to a new owner which continued reporting to the TRI (see the example of facilities d1 and d2 in Figure A-2 ), but we did not have the DUNSnumber values for both facilities and therefore automatically match the TRI records with the DUNSnumber that we have. For this scenario, we can usually see a time gap of several years with no TRI records under this TRIFID, which signals a gap between the relocation of the old facility and the start of operations of the new facility. In some of observations (about 3.5% relocated facilities), a sudden large jump in toxic releases when the reported address changed also suggests a possible change of ownership and production plan.
The other possibility is that no relocation actually took place. We found that the address information of a facility in the NETS data can be a contact address instead of the physical address of a facility. However, since NETS identifies facility relocations based on the recorded addresses, there is a potential for NETS to mis-identify relocation. We deal with this situation in a conservative way and drop all the facilities with such
inconsistency. An alternative way is to treat these facilities as non-relocated and assume these moves did not happen. This assumption however is too strict and unrealistic. We investigated deeper into the background behind facilities' relocation by searching the website of thousands of facilities in the TRI and going to Google map and visually examining the change of the site of facilities. We found that a change of contact address instead of the physical address was highly likely to be a result of a merge or acquisition of one facility by a firm operating other existing facility. In this case, it is not reasonable to treat the acquired facility as not relocated or as having shutdown, because some of its production was transferred to the acquiring firm's facility and some other parts were kept in the original facility. It is also not reasonable to match the NETS data of the acquired or the acquiring facility with the TRI data of the two facilities that jointly reported after relocating. Therefore, eliminating these complicated cases from the sample is a costly but safe way to
generate a clean dataset to analyze relocation. The above process is time-consuming and complicated. More details are available from the authors upon request.
Second, we find that some relocation records in NETS are not real and may actually be only a result of clerical errors. For example, some relocation has an origin address of "ABC street" and a destination address of "#XXX ABC Street", with only a street number added. This looks like a correction of a clerical error. Although it may also be a real address change from somewhere on the ABC street to #XXX in the same street, but such within-street move is not likely to be across census tracts. We keep these facilities with such suspicious relocation records in the sample but treat them as non-relocated facilities. Note that for these observations, if TRIFID is available for both addresses, it is the same; but if the facility reported only for one of those addresses, TRIFID will be missing for one of the addresses.
Some other records in the merged data with no change in the NETS address (i.e., non-relocation records) also show slightly difference in the street address or name between the TRI and NETS information (typically with different street number). We eliminate the facilities with this type of potential clerical error on the address considering the existing large number of non-relocated facilities in the sample.
Final Sample
In the original TRI data from EPA, we have 51,620 TRIFIDs with one or more reports since the start of TRI data collection in 1987 to 2011. After the above matching process with the NETS data from 1990 to 2011, we have 36,207 TRIFIDs, i.e. a matching rate of 70.1%. Following this process, facilities that reported to TRI but shutdown before 1990 are dropped because of missing information in NETS which starts at 1990. Within the remaining TRIFIDs, we additionally drop the facilities located outside the US continent counties, born after 1990, with inconsistent information in NETS and TRI, and having missing values in the covariates. We also do not use the TRI records after the relocation of the facilities, as we are explaining the relocation tendency of the facilities using the pre-relocation characteristics. We end up with 21,413 TRIFIDs in the final sample. The step-by-step detail of this process is shown in Table A-1. The number of facilities is greater than the number of matched TRIFIDs because of two reasons. First, TRIFIDs can be recycled so that some TRIFIDs are shared by several different DUNSnumber values as illustrated in Figure A -2. Second, some facilities only have TRI records before 1990 which is out of our sampling period, yielding no reported TRI data of these facilities in the sample. However, we include them in the sample because they might still be affected by the community pressure in 1990 after their emission information in the pre-1990 years was disclosed in mid-1989, especially if they still generated toxic pollution but were below the reporting threshold after 1990, or if the firms thought it was likely to exceed the reporting threshold in the future.
